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Abstract 
Recognizing the fact that comprehension, analysis and transmission of reality are based on 
diversely structured socio-political contexts as well as on different categorical and 
essential postulates, offers a prospect of enrichment. Thus, this article presents an analysis 
and interpretation of one of the first Chinese theoreticians, working in the field of 
intercultural methodology. Although Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973) can be considered as 
one of the leading Chinese philosophers of the 20th Century, his criticism of Sinicized 
Marxist ideologies marked him as a political dissident and he was consequently consigned 
to oblivion for several decades; only recently has his work been rediscovered by a number 
of younger Chinese theorists, who have shown a growing interest in his ideas. Although he 
is still relatively unknown in the West, Zhang definitely deserves to be recognized for his 
contributions to Chinese and comparative philosophy. The present article focuses on his 
extraordinary ability to introduce Western thought in a way which was compatible with the 
specific methodology of traditional Chinese thought. According to such presumptions, 
culture is viewed as an entity composed of a number of specific discourses and relations. 
The article shows how the interweaving and interdependence of these discourses form 
different cultural backgrounds, which manifest themselves in the specific, culturally 
determined structures of language and logic. It also explains the role of traditional 
elements in his cultural epistemology. 
Keywords: cultural epistemology, language, logic, Chinese philosophy, intercultural 
methodology 
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1 On the Cultural Conditioning of Cognition  
As an academic discipline, Chinese studies were established within the context of 
discussions on Orientalism, which laid the foundations of and conditioned the 
colonialist approach to the study of cultures which do not derive from the so-called 
Western tradition. This is why the criticism of elements of Orientalism in sinology 
is also the criticism of the violent nature of the classic relation between knowledge 
and authority. Within this framework, every comparison is also inevitably an 
interpretation based on a system of values, the contents of which are determined 
by the ideology of material progress, and whose methodology is that of European 
formal logic. The acritical use of a scientific analysis which is, in itself, a result of 
specific historical processes and their related social organizations and structures, 
can prove to be a perilous and misleading exercise. 
Over the past few decades, the theoretical streams of contemporary Chinese 
studies and modern Chinese philosophy have devoted increasing attention to 
investigating and comparing the substantial and methodological assumptions of 
the so-called “Eastern” and “Western” traditions1. However, the comparison and 
understanding of so-called foreign cultures is always linked to the issue of 
differences in language, tradition, history and socialization processes. The 
interpretation of various aspects and elements of non-European cultures always 
involves the geographic, political and economic position of the interpreter, as well 
as that of the object being interpreted.  
Irrespective of the question as to where the concern for the “clarification” and 
“determination” of similarities and differences of both epistemological systems 
arises2, the search for a dialogue has always been determined by constant attempts 
to supersede and resume the limits of knowledge, and walks a fine line between 
                                                 
1 In the present work, the terms “Eastern” and “Western” as categorically interpretative models are 
not used in a rigidly political or geographical sense, but as notions that stem from a reflection on the 
distinction between transcendental and immanent metaphysics. The concept “Western” means the 
area of culture and civilisation which has been defined by the three Abrahamic – Semitic religions, 
i.e. Judaism, Islam and Christianity. The most important characteristics which these religions have in 
common are: transcendentalism, monotheism (or the Trinity in Christianity), singularity (the 
monopoly of validity), universality (universality of validity), individuality (which has been 
constituted by a separate and independent existence of the Self, inhabited by the soul) and the idea of 
immortality. None of these elements can be found in discourses of immanent metaphysics, which are 
prevalent in so-called “Eastern” civilisations. (Galtung 1994: 7) When the term “Western” is applied 
to language, it indicates the languages of the Indo-European group.  
2 In European sinology, most researches are an attempt to seek for a solution to the “crisis of 
European philosophy”. However, both “Western” and Chinese thinkers are motivated by the search 
for their own cultural identity through reflection of the “Other”.  
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revelation and acceptance, narration and interpretation3. The constantly growing 
number of studies in this area is due to, among other things, the increasingly 
urgent need to clarify the methodological foundations of the modern theory of 
science, which must keep abreast of the technological and political developments 
of modern societies. 
Over the past few decades, the previously 4  “absurd” assumption that the 
“Western” theory of knowledge does not constitute the sole, universally valid 
epistemological discourse, something which would have been unthinkable for the 
majority of “Western” theorists less than a century ago, has now become a 
generally recognized fact among most present-day cultural exponents and 
communities. It has become clear to most people that “Western epistemology” 
represents only one of many different forms of historically transmitted social 
models for the perception and interpretation of reality (Sloterdijk 1996: 89). 
However, despite the growing number of issues related to “Western” cultural 
identity, nearly every “Western” incursion into the field of Chinese studies 
remains essentially comparative, because virtually all intercultural research is 
based on a cognitive reflection on a subject which has been expressed in terms of 
its respective language and culture.  
Failing to take into account the specific conditions determined by different 
historical, linguistic and cultural contexts inevitably leads to misinterpretations of 
the object being examined. Unfortunately, in current intercultural research, it is 
still common to project elements of the contents and forms of discourse which 
have been overshadowed by the dominant political (and thus also economic) 
power, upon the object being considered. This is true even in the case of 
investigations and interpretations of contents which arose in different 
circumstances and in differently structured social and cultural contexts. This 
danger has also been recognized by a number of modern and contemporary 
Chinese scholars, engaged in researching and re-examining traditional Chinese 
philosophical thought. In the foreword of his book on traditional Chinese logic, 
Prof. Cui Qingtian writes5:  
                                                 
3 Although (not coincidentally) the present time is characterised by intense debates on intercultural 
hermeneutics, serious inquiries into this topic are still quite rare in the “Western” world (which is 
hardly accidental either).  
4 In the colonial and postcolonial period. 
5 All original quotations from Chinese texts have been translated into English by the author. 
Jana S. ROŠKER: A Chinese View on the Cultural Conditionality of Logic… 
 
46 
To compare Chinese and Western logic means to look upon them as 
independent phenomena, each determined by its own culture. If we take into 
account their respective cultural backgrounds, we can still observe many of 
their congruities; but we must also pay attention to the large number of 
elements which constitute their decisive differences. Only on this basis will 
we be able to discern common features as well as the specific characteristics 
of particulary traditional forms of logic. Comparing means searching for 
common properties but, even more importantly, it means being able to 
distinguish the basic differences which underlie such conformities. Only by 
acknowledging differences can we comprehend the manifold nature of logic, 
its history and the laws of its development. (Cui 2001: 9) 
Despite the tendency towards openness and interdisciplinary approach, the 
discourses of modern science and humanities are still predominantly determined 
by the paradigmatic network which serves the interests of the “New World”. Cui 
therefore criticizes the paternalistic discourses which still represent the generally 
accepted valuation criterion not only in Western, but also in Chinese comparative 
research (the obligatory logical method for such evaluation is, of course, that of 
“Western” formal logic, although this is never explicitly stated by the author6) as 
follows: 
Viewing a certain type of logic primarily as something which should be 
similar to, or even identical with some other type of logic cannot be 
considered as comparative research, but merely as imitation. Such procedures 
are incapable of taking into account the enormous differences between the 
methods of Chinese and Western logic, as well as the specific features which 
condition these methods. While this approach makes extraordinary efforts to 
discover the common traits of both methods, it adheres to only one logical 
tradition with which all other forms of traditional logic, including the 
development of new methods, must concur. This form of comparative 
research in the field of logic is incapable of arriving at new recognitions or 
achieving a creative analysis of the manifold nature of different, culturally-
bounded logical traditions. It can only produce plagiarisms and bad copies of 
already existing methods. (ibid.) 
But the pioneer of such insights into the complexity of intercultural methodology 
was doubtless Zhang Dongsun, a Chinese philosopher from the first half of the 
previous century, who’s greatest contribution was the creation and development of 
a modern theory of knowledge, based upon ancient Chinese and Chan – Buddhist 
epistemology. His plural epistemology represents a felicitous synthesis of modern 
                                                 
6 The reason for such discretion is, of course, the paradigmatic Chinese politeness which prevents 
him from expressing his criticisms directly, but only indirectly and “between the lines”. 
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science and traditional Chinese thought. Nevertheless, he also deserves our 
attention as one of the first Chinese intellectuals, who investigated questions on 
the cultural impacts upon cognition. His studies also provided many other valuable 
insights into the differences between Chinese and Western philosophy. Although 
his work is not well known in the Western countries, his investigations of the 
influence of Chinese language on the development of Chinese philosophy are very 
influential in contemporary China. Besides, he was the first philosopher who 
exposed correlative thinking as a main characteristic of Chinese philosophy and 
analogical argument as a specific Chinese mode of inference. Although he is still 
relatively unknown in the West, Zhang definitely deserves to be recognized for his 
contributions to Chinese and comparative philosophy (Jiang 2002: 78).  
 
2 Zhang Dongsun, His Life and Work 
While Zhang Dongsun can also be considered as one of the leading Chinese 
philosophers of the 20th cxentury, his criticism of Sinicized Marxist ideologies 
marked him as a political dissident and he was consequently consigned to oblivion 
for several decades; only recently has his work been rediscovered by a number of 
younger Chinese theorists, who have shown a growing interest in his ideas. During 
the first three decades of the 20th century, Zhang was one of the most influential 
thinkers of the Republic of China, a reputation which rested, in part, on his 
extraordinary ability to introduce Western thought in a way which was compatible 
with the spirit of Chinese tradition. 
His work indicates not only a profound understanding of Western theories, but 
also a comprehension of the linguistic structures that condition them. At the same 
time, Zhang also remained rooted in his own, Chinese tradition of thought. As a 
youth, he benefited from a wide-ranging and exhaustive classical Chinese 
education, and he was one of the first philosophers who, as an alternative to 
Western Hegelian dialectic, developed and elaborated the traditional system of 
correlative thought, which was based upon Daoist philosophy, as well as upon 
certain theoretical paradigms of the Book of Changes.  
The whole of his ontological and epistemological thought was also strongly 
influenced by the philosophy of Chan Buddhism, and his system represents one of 
the first coherent and complete synthesis of ancient Chinese and modern Western 
ideas. However, for most contemporary scholars his greatest contribution was in 
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his role as the first modern Chinese philosopher who created his own theoretical 
system, especially in the field of epistemology (Jiang 2002: 57).   
In contrast to most of his contemporaries, whose work was characterized by a 
revisionism of traditional philosophy, Zhang’s theory was a synthesis based on the 
assimilation of Western thought into the framework of traditional methodological 
and conceptual discourses.  
As Chang Wing-tsit has pointed out, Zhang indisputably assimilated the most 
Western thought, established the most comprehenshive and well-coordinated 
system, and exerted the greatest influence among the western-oriented 
Chinese philosophers’. Epistemology is the core of Zhang’s philosophy, 
which began with a pluralistic epistemology and culminated in a cultural one. 
(ibid.: 66).   
Zhang’s pluralism was based upon a revision of Kant’s philosophy, in which he 
followed his own system of so-called panstructuralist cosmology, which was to a 
certain extent also influenced by the Chan-Buddhist philosophy upon which his 
own worldview was based on. Zhang Dongsun’s cultural epistemology was 
founded upon a “pluralistic theory of knowledge” (duoyuan renshi lun), and 
proceeded from the premise that knowledge was culturally determined and 
therefore essentially of a cultural nature, an aspect of his philosophy which still 
remains quite actual, especially in the field of intercultural research. His cultural-
philosophical studies are based upon detailed comparative analyses of Chinese and 
European thought, with a special attention to the influence of linguistic structures 
upon various philosophical systems, and the connection between culturally 
determined differences and systems of logical reasoning in different traditions of 
thought.  
Although Zhang’s comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy 
were written a half century ago, they remain of great value even today. They 
will continue to throw light on current debates on cultural issues and to inspire 
comparative philosophy in our own time. (ibid.: 58) 
 
3 Language and Logic: Problems of Comprehension and 
Transmission 
Linguistic analysis is an important part of Zhang’s philosophy, and his logic is 
also closely connected to the logic of language. In his treatise Knowledge and 
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Culture (Zhishi yu wenhua), he argues that language can help us to form our 
reasoning. (Li 2001: 352) 
On the one hand, language creates thought, or opens new ways to it. But on 
the other, it also raises new problems by creating new expressions. In other 
words: through its expressions, language defines pathways of human thought, 
from which it is not easy to escape (Zhang 1995: 253). 
In this respect, many interpreters of Zhang’s thought believed him to be seconding 
Sapir-Whorf’s hypothesis that language defined the mode of thought (Li 2001: 
352), a concept which remains extremely problematic in academic circles today. 
However, Zhang distanced himself from such an interpretation, and to a Japanese 
critic who had accused him of advocating such a linguistic determination in his 
article “Differences between Chinese and Western philosophy from the viewpoint 
of linguistic structures” (Cong yanyu gouzao shang kan Zhong Xi zhexuede chayi) 
(ibid.), Zhang replied: 
It seems that this interpreter thinks that I advocated the view that language 
determines thought. This is completely wrong, and this critic seems to be 
trapped in some old frames of thought. The fact that language cannot be seen 
as cause, nor as a consequence of thought, already follows from the aspect of 
functional relations. The contrary view, which claims that thought is the cause, 
and language the consequence, is equally wrong. All I said in my article was, 
that language, logic and philosophical thought are interdependent and 
interconnected (Zhang 1995: 383).  
This interdependence and reciprocal influence of language and thought was the 
basis of all Zhang’s logical and philosophical approaches, and can also be seen in 
his emphasis on the close connection between language and the laws of logic. 
Logic was created because of linguistic problems. Therefore, logic does 
nothing other than try to regulate language. Why does language need 
regulation? Because of disputation. The beginnings of logic in ancient Greece 
can be found in rhetoric. Rhetoric was originally developed because of 
disputation; at that time, rhetoric was not yet a doctrine for beautiful speech 
and writing. The oldest Indian logic also arose from disputation in the sense 
of argumentation and counter-argumentation. In China, formal logic was 
never developed, but the art of disputation dates from the earliest times. Those 
who dealt with the art of disputation were called dialecticians. The demand 
for a regulation of language therefore arose from disputation (ibid.: 240).   
Zhang Dongsun argued that the logic of disputation (in the sense of arguments and 
counter-arguments, i.e. of thesis and antithesis) was also developed in ancient 
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Greece, and that this form of logical method was not elaborated later on because 
the European tradition focused on the development of formal logic instead. In the 
history of traditional European logic, even Aristotelian logic still implied two main 
methods: the method of evidences and the method of disputation; later 
developments, however, concentrated upon syllogisms, based upon the former 
method, while the latter was gradually forgotten (Li 2001: 353). A renewed 
research into the logic of argumentation by certain logicians7 did not occur before 
the latter half of the 20th century: 
Zhang Dongsun had already stressed this aspect during the 1940’s, arguing 
for a reexamination of the entire framework of Aristotelian logic. This was a 
very rare and valuable effort on his part (ibid.). 
According to Zhang, the inextricably interwoven relationship between language 
and logic was already evident in the system of grammatical structures; in his view, 
the laws of logical methods also arose from the laws of linguistic structures. 
Therefore, the main function of such logic is to regulate language. Due to 
customary modes of expression, language does not always correspond to 
rational principles. Thus, it became a kind of necessity, and this method 
developed out of this necessity. It tried to re-establish a correspondence 
between language and rational principles, i.e. logic. This necessity is 
essentially a social one and does not arise from solely rational domains, as 
was thought by some later scholars (Zhang 1995: 388–389). 
Here, we can see the influence of traditional Chinese epistemology which, on the 
basis of the relation between language and reality, tried to “rationally” (i.e. in 
accordance with the most appropriate structural regulation (dao) of language as an 
expression of all that exists) standardize (chang) linguistic structures in order to 
improve and harmonize political and social relations within society. However, his 
approach here can also be compared to some recent researches in linguistic logic, 
which focus upon linguistic pragmatism (Li 2001: 153–354): “In my opinion, 
traditional logic is a discipline which deals primarily with the intrinsic structures 
of human discourses” (Zhang 1995: 389).  
In terms of the rules of logic, Zhang Dongsun appropriated Carnap’s theory of 
linguistic games: 
                                                 
7 One of the first pioneers in this field was the Belgian logician Ch. Perelman (1912–1984). 
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Logic as such is a game. Its effectiveness is due to its ability to establish self-
sufficient rules. The principles of symbolic logic, such as the so-called 
principles of permutation, addition, substitution, summation or association 
etc., resemble the rules of chess, where the knight can jump over the castle. 
The deductive system that was developed based upon these rules is essentially 
tautological and therefore, of course, self-sufficient and consistent. But we 
should realize that all such systems are essentially arbitrary. (Zhang 1995: 253) 
For Zhang, the basic function of language is expressing and transmitting thought. 
For this reason, he established a new concept of the so-called “domain or 
discourse of logic (mingli jie)” which posited a sphere of structural principles that 
exist beyond the external (waijie) and the internal (neijie) worlds. This sphere was 
to be understood neither as some sort of formalized copy of external reality, nor as 
a psychological representation of the structure of consciousness. In Zhang’s view, 
the domain of logic was an independent and inherently consistent, autonomous, 
“intrinsic” structure of rules (benyoude guize), which was also figured as the main 
subject of logical research.  
 
4 The Universality and Cultural Conditionality of Epistemology  
However, logic is not only a discourse of language, but also a metaphysical tool 
for ideologies which internally bind and knit societies and cultures together.  
From the viewpoint of culture, logic, metaphysics, morals, society and politics 
are a unity which came into being out of the same necessities. If we break 
down the wall which surrounds it, we can see that what we considered to be 
logic, is in fact, a kind of social theory. What we considered to be 
metaphysics, in fact is only a question of certain morals. And what we 
considered to be a moral theory, in fact is nothing but a kind of political 
movement. In other words: each political movement needs to be based upon a 
certain morality. Each moral system needs to be protected by a certain 
metaphysics, and metaphysics, in turn, requires logic as a tool. (ibid.: 419).  
Culture was thus an entity composed of a number of specific discourses and 
relations. The interweavement and interdependence of these discourses form the 
specific cultural background, which is also expressed in the structures of language 
and logic:  
Logic arose from social needs and developed in parallel with philosophy. 
Therefore, logic is not universal and basic. In addition, there is no single 
“logic as such”, since there are many different kinds of existing logics. Who 
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knows, perhaps this viewpoint represents a challenge to Chinese logicians? 
(Zhang 1995: 388).  
Hence, Zhang argued that logic was culturally determined; like language, it had 
developed on the basis of cognitive patterns which, at the same time, were formed 
by logic. Zhang very schematically distinguished four elementary forms of 
existing logic: the first was Aristotelian, the second mathematical, the third was 
the Indian logic of double negation and the fourth he named social-political logic, 
which included Hegelian dialectics and Marxist dialectical materialism (ibid.: 
387–401). 
In his view, the cultural determination of logic was, to some degree, connected 
with the cultural conditionality of comprehension. Based on this assumption, 
together with elements of his pluralistic epistemology, Zhang developed his 
(inter)cultural theory of knowledge: 
Pluralistic epistemology reveals that knowledge is not an objective reflection 
of external things; and pan-structuralism argues that there is no substance for 
us to know. Knowing does not mean representing what there is outside of us, 
but signifies the construction or recreation of the contents of knowledge in 
relation to the structures of the universe. For this reason, the need for 
objective elements in knowledge is obvious. How, then, are the subjective 
contents of knowledge decided? Zhang believed that, in addition to the 
common structure of human knowledge as described in his pluralistic 
epistemology, culture plays a significant role in forming our knowledge, and 
that knowledge is culturally and socially determined. Therefore, in order to 
discuss knowledge, we must also discuss culture. In this sense, the knowing 
mind is a collective mind. According to Zhang, epistemology in the past only 
talked about the solitary mind, but there is no solitary mind. (Jiang 2002: 68)  
Based on the premise of the close connection between various languages and the 
cultural determination of coincidental specific modes of logical reasoning, Zhang 
proceeded to develop his thesis on the linguistic foundations of European and 
Chinese philosophy. In his view, a key factor determining the specificity of 
“Chinese” thought was the fact that the Chinese language (especially ancient 
Chinese) made no clear distinction between subject and predicate, while in 
morphological terms it did not add suffixes to express categories of time, gender 
or number) (Zhang 1995: 360). Zhang argued that this grammatical feature had 
greatly influenced Chinese thought. Since the subject is not distinguished in the 
Chinese language, the Chinese do not have the concept of a subject; because the 
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subject is not distinguished, the predicate is not distinguished either (Jiang 2002: 
72). 
In addition, the Chinese language generally does not use sentential subjects, as 
opposed to Indo-European languages which omitted sentential subjects only in 
exceptional cases.  
The Chinese language does not apply subjects and omits them quite often. 
Therefore, we generally conclude that the subject is not particularly necessary. 
(Zhang 1995: 363) 
Another difference is that Chinese lacks the equivalent of the expression “it”: 
Neither the colloquial zhe, nor the classical ci in the Chinese language is 
equivalent to the English word “it”. The Chinese word ci merely means the 
same as the English word “this”. This word has its contrary: the word 
ci/“this”/ is opposed to the word bi/“that”/, and therefore cannot be applied as 
the indefinite pronoun. (ibid.) 
“It” is an indefinite pronoun, but “this” is not. Chinese lacks the form “it is”. “It 
is” expresses only the existence of something and not its attributes, and this 
separation of existence from atributes is a basic condition for forming the concept 
of substance (Jiang 2002: 73). But the most important difference Zhang noted was 
that between the Indo-European expression “to be” and the Chinese word shi. 
The Chinese language does not have an equivalent to the Western word “to 
be”. The colloquial shi does not express existence, while the ancient Chinese 
wei means the same as cheng, as in the English phrase “to become”. However, 
in the English language, the words “becoming” and “being” are contradictory. 
(Zhang 1995: 363)  
“To be” implies “to exist” and being in existence. Shi (“is”) in spoken Chinese 
does not imply “to exist”. Ancient Chinese had the expressions you (“to have”) 
and cheng (“to become”), but not the equivalent of “to be”. Since Chinese lacks an 
expression for “to be”, it has difficulty in forming the subject-predicate 
propositions of standard logic (Jiang 2002: 73). 
Due to the absence of the linguistic (and thus also cognitive) category 
“subject” (zhuti), and the absence of the expression “to be” in ancient as well as 
modern Chinese, traditional Chinese philosophy never established or developed 
the concept or discipline of “ontology” (benti lun). Therefore, classical Chinese 
philosophy also never developed formal logic based upon theorems (mingti), and 
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even the basic law of traditional European logic, i.e. the law of identity, (tongyi 
lü)8, was alien to specific Chinese thought. 
The Chinese system of logic was not based upon the law of identity (logic 
without identity). Because the Western logical system of classifications is 
based upon the law of identity, it necessarily developed dichotomies. (Zhang 
1995: 363) 
However, this does not signify that traditional Chinese thought did not develop its 
own logic, which Zhang defined as “non-Aristotelian” logic: 
Chinese thought cannot be forced into the framework of Western logic; in fact, 
we must recognize that logic, as it developed in China, represents a 
completely different system. (ibid.: 365) 
Therefore, the specificity of Chinese logic can not be found in the framework of 
Western cognitive patterns: 
If we search for contributions of Chinese logic in the framework of 
Aristotelian logic, we will necessarily conclude that there was no logic in 
ancient China (Zhang in Li 2001: 358). 
Zhang Dongsun concluded that Aristotelian logic, based upon the law of identity, 
developed the structure of dichotomies rooted in contradictions of the type “A and 
not-A”. Such relations were mutually exclusive (Zhang 1995: 364): 
But Chinese thought did not function in this way. Dual oppositions, such as 
big and small, above and below, good and evil, or presence and absence, were 
seen as mutually defining and interdependent. (ibid.) 
The classification of the type “A and B”, however, makes it possible for something 
not to be A or B; such non-exclusionary distinctions were quite common in 
Chinese logic. Logical definitions in the Aristotelian sense are equivalents, in 
which the symbol of identity connects the definiendum and the definiens (ibid.). 
Ancient Chinese logic lacked such definitions: according to this logic, the meaning 
of a word can be understood or clarified by looking at its opposite. For this reason, 
definitions found in Western logic do not exist in Chinese logic. The meaning of a 
word is not made clear by a definition, but by contrasting it with its opposite. For 
example, a “wife” is a “woman who has a husband”, and a “husband” is a “man, 
                                                 
8 Zhang considered the two remaining elementary laws, i.e. the law of contradiction (maodun lü) and 
the law of the excluded third (pai zhong lü), merely as variations of the law of identity.  
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who has a wife”. This is not a strict definition but an explanation in terms of a 
relation (Jiang 2002: 75). 
Zhang Dongsun is the first philosopher we know of, who defined the 
conceptual basis of specific traditional Chinese logic. Its foundations were 
relational propositions, just as Western logic was based upon the proposition of the 
subject-object structure. The correlation between dual, but complementary 
oppositions (such as above-below, before-behind, etc.) thus represented a specific 
approach of ancient Chinese logic. 
Zhang named this specific logic, as it was formed and developed in ancient 
China, correlative logic (xiangguan lü mingxue) or the logic of correlative duality 
(liangyuan xiangguan lü mingxue) (Zhang 1995: 365). In contrast to the Hegelian 
method, which was based upon mutually exclusionary contradictions, the methods 
of ancient Chinese dialectical logic (bianzheng mingxue) represented a dynamic 
inter-relational process of inter-dependent and complementary poles, as could 
already be found in the theoretical approaches of the Book of Changes (ibid.). This 
was a very creative insight, since the logic of the Book of Changes was created 
much earlier than Moist or Dialectical Logic, which arose approximately in the 4th 
century BC. 
Due to his ostracism during the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Dongsun’s 
theories were consigned to oblivion for many years. Recently, however, a younger 
generation of theorists has begun to rediscover his work, though often expressing 
reservations as to its more problematical aspects: “Some of his conclusions are 
invalid from the viewpoint of contemporary theory” (Jiang 2002: 75). 
However, most contemporary thinkers acknowledge his valuable and often 
innovative contributions to the development of Chinese philosophical thought, and 
especially his pioneering role in the discovery and interpretation of correlative 
dialectic, pointing out the important fact, that he was probably the first scholar to 
attribute correlative thinking to Chinese philosophy (ibid.: 74). As already 
mentioned, Zhang Dongsun was also one of the founders of the relatively new 
fields of intercultural philosophy and methodologies of intercultural research. His 
recognition that ancient Indian logic was of a different kind than Aristotelian logic, 
and that ancient Chinese logic was in many respects quite different from both, is 
doubtlessly true. His most valuable contributions are also to be found in his 
endeavors to elaborate the dialectical aspect of Aristotelian logic, to connect logic, 
language and methods of disputation, and to discover principles and formal 
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elements of the logic of linguistic pragmatism. Recently, many Chinese and 
foreign theorists began to address these questions, and their research has already 
produced some important results. However, Zhang was the first to see the far-
reaching significance of these problems, and can be considered something of a 
visionary in this respect (Li 2001: 358).  
Despite the fact that certain aspects of his thought are incomplete and 
insufficiently systematic 9 , Zhang Dongsun definitely deserves the attention 
currently being paid to his work by both Western and Chinese scholars. 
Although Zhang’s greatest contribution was most certainly the creation and 
development of a modern theory of knowledge, based upon ancient Chinese and 
Chan-Buddhist epistemology, and which in many respects represents a felicitous 
synthesis of modern science and traditional Chinese thought, we must not forget 
that his comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy helped to 
establish a new epistemology, according to which cognition is influenced by 
culture. His studies also contributed greatly to comparative philosophy itself and 
provided many valuable insights into the differences between Chinese and 
Western philosophy. Zhang’s investigation of the influence of Chinese language 
on the development of Chinese philosophy is a very influential and pioneering 
work. His hypothesis that correlative thinking is a characteristic of Chinese 
philosophy and analogical argument is a Chinese mode of inference has been 
widely adopted by scholars in comparative philosophy.  
 
5 Tradition in Modern Disguise 
Zhang Dongsun’s cultural epistemology has been strongly influenced by 
traditional Chinese theory of knowledge. For him, because the ideal foundations of 
epistemology have been culturally conditioned, they correspond to the specific 
structures and concrete conditions of the society from which they originate. In 
classical Chinese epistemologies, the relation between man, as an existential entity 
endowed with consciousness, and the world, viewed either as a labyrinthine 
external environment or the reflection of an equally unknown subjectivity which is 
immanent and unique to each individual, can be defined in many different ways. 
                                                 
9 These deficiencies are mostly due to the fact that Zhang Dongsun was prohibited from writing and 
publishing during the last 25 years of his life, and therefore was unable to refine and perfect his 
theory in terms of style, terminology, system and essence.  
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Its basic structure, which is simultaneously reflected in the main postulates of 
several traditional theories of knowledge (Xia 1986: 67–82), has always been 
dependent on the motivation and purpose of the process of comprehension: in the 
Chinese philosophical tradition, knowledge is centered on the harmonization of 
Self and the world. Whereas in mainstream Western philosophy, knowledge is for 
overcoming the world; in the Buddhist philosophical tradition, knowledge is for 
overcoming the self (Cheng 1989: 207).  
Of course, this kind of harmonization does not necessarily mean that all 
elements within the cosmic and social whole are equal. The main guide is 
regularity, which can be based either upon a conformity with the essential 
principles of the cosmic whole, or upon the hierarchically structured determination 
of existence, which is decisive in defining the concrete activities and the life of 
every single individual.  
It is no accident that this postulate of harmonic regulation became the principal 
ideal guideline for philosophical discourses in ancient China. This basic revision 
of classical Chinese thought took place during a turbulent and critical period of 
economic and political transition, in which various local rulers of relatively small 
feudal and culturally, linguistically and economically diverse states were engaged 
in a power struggle. Classical Chinese philosophy was therefore established upon 
a narrow foundation, which combined the hegemonic tendencies of various local 
warlords on the one hand, with the conflicts between different, but parallel modes 
of production, on the other. Against a background of different value- and belief-
systems, this motley conglomerate of agrarian, nomadic, artisan and semi-
mercantile cultures also included a variety of languages and writings. It was only 
natural, therefore, that the hegemonic tendencies of the various holders of power 
would demand a unified ideology. The formation and preservation of this ideology 
was thus conditioned by a unified perception of reality. Because most members of 
society were in that critical period in whuch they were also victims of conflicts 
among opposing systems and social structures, this form of unification was also 
intended to provide a basic framework for social security.  
Human reflection, as expressed within the most influential currents of classical 
Chinese thought, is therefore based upon the individual’s awareness of their own 
position within the integrality of the world; no one has been thrust into it “from 
outside”, for the birth and growth of each individual is part of the totality of being. 
The individual is conditioned by a specific human understanding, which is not 
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only defined at the level of sensory perception, but also includes cognitively, i.e. 
linguistically determined thought.  
Here, we can sense the leitmotiv of Zhang’s cultural epistemology. The basic 
difficulty with the ancient Chinese epistemological theories has namely been 
emerging precisely at this point, involving the interpretation and transmission of 
reality that served as the basis for social interactions. The harmonic regularity that 
represents the elementary postulate for a process of comprehension which is 
applicable a priori, has in this context naturally been linked to questions of 
language and its relation to reality.  
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